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Abstract 
 
In the new millennium, there have been important empirical developments in the philosophy of 
mathematics. One of these directions is the so-called “empirical philosophy of mathematics” 
(EPM) of Buldt, Löwe, Müller and Müller-Hill, which aims to complement the methodology in 
philosophy of mathematics with empirical work. Among other things, this includes surveys of 
mathematicians, which EPM believes to give philosophically important results. In this paper I take 
a critical look at the sociological part of EPM as a case study of sociological approaches to the 
philosophy of mathematics, focusing on the most concrete development of EPM so far: a 
questionnaire-based study by Müller-Hill. I will argue that the study has many problems and the 
EPM conclusion of context-dependency of mathematical knowledge is unwarranted by the 
evidence. In addition, I will consider the general justification and criteria for introducing 
sociological methods in the philosophy of mathematics. While surveys can give us important data 
about the philosophical views of mathematicians, there is no reason to believe that mathematicians 
have a privileged access to philosophical questions concerning mathematics. In order to be 
philosophically relevant in the way EPM claim, the philosophical views of mathematicians cannot 
be assessed without considering the argumentation behind them. 
 
1 Introduction 
In the philosophy of mathematics of the new millennium, empirical approaches to epistemological 
questions have become increasingly popular. These empirical approaches can take many forms. 
One research field takes the best empirical data from psychology, cognitive science and 
neurobiology to be philosophically relevant. Experiments, most often involving small children and 
animals, are used to explain the development of basic mathematical concepts like natural numbers. 
Empirical scientists like Dehaene (2011), Spelke (2011) and Nieder (2011) have presented theories 
about the origins of arithmetical knowledge, and these have been developed philosophically by the 
likes of De Cruz, Neth & Schlimm (2010) and Pantsar (2014).  
Another important development is the philosophy of mathematical practice, made known by the 
likes of Aspray and Kitcher (1988), Corfield (2003) and Mancosu (ed.) (2008). In this approach, 
the main objective is to move philosophical discourse away from idealized mathematical theories 
and methodology toward mathematics as it is actually practiced. The philosophy of mathematical 
practice is a wide research field with versatile methodology, ranging from historical analysis of 
mathematical texts to contemporary questions about mathematical practice including such 
questions as visualization, use of computers and the interaction of mathematics with other sciences 
- among many other issues (Mancosu (ed.) 2008). 
As part of this rising popularity of the philosophy of mathematical practice, philosophers have 
become increasingly interested in the way mathematicians use and understand the key concepts in 
the philosophy of mathematics. Two such key questions are how the concepts of proof and 
knowledge are used among mathematicians. In the philosophy of mathematical practice, it is often 
noted that the robust conception of formal proof based on Frege's (1879) Begriffsschrift - and 
developed in great detail in Principia Mathematica by Whitehead and Russell - rarely corresponds 
to actual mathematics. But while it is indeed acknowledged that mathematicians mostly publish 
informal proofs instead of complete formal derivations, this has generally been seen merely as 
facilitating communication - not as weakening the formal criteria in mathematics. However, this 
has been challenged recently by Löwe & Müller (2008, p. 95): 
...mathematicians publish informal proofs. However, there is more to informal proof than 
ease of communication. It just isn’t the case that mathematicians have a derivation in mind 
and transform it into an informal proof for publication in order to reach a wider public—
the entire procedure of doing research mathematics rests on doing informal proofs. [...] We 
need to take seriously the fact that derivations are hardly ever used. Subscribing to the 
tempting image of the derivations as the real objects of mathematical study to which 
informal proofs are imperfect approximations would be a violation of our maxim of taking 
mathematical practice seriously. 
Rather than practical approximations, according to Löwe & Müller the informal proofs of 
mathematicians are in fact central to mathematical practice. If this is indeed the case, it would have 
important consequences in the epistemology of mathematics. What would it mean, for example, 
to say that someone knows a theorem? In the traditional picture, in which informal proofs are mere 
short-hands for logical derivations, the idea is that to know a proof is to grasp its content and to be 
able, in principle, to work out the formal details of an informal proof (Steiner 1975, 100). But what 
if informal proofs do not work like that? What if they are, as Löwe and Müller argue, hardly ever 
transformed into formal derivations? Mathematical proof, and mathematical knowledge-
ascriptions, would seem to be much more heterogeneous phenomena. This is an idea that Löwe & 
Müller, together with Buldt and Müller-Hill, want to take seriously in what they call the Empirical 
philosophy of mathematics.1 
 
The main purpose of Empirical philosophy of mathematics (from here on EPM) is “the 
development of a philosophical study of mathematics as a discipline based on empirical facts” 
(BLM, p. 323) and its “theoretical foundation should contain a sustained argument for the 
methodology of conceptual modeling, and should contain in particular an argument for the 
necessity to empirically check those philosophical theories that were established via this method” 
(ibid.). 
Emphasizing the connections to empirical facts and mathematical practice is of course nothing 
new in philosophy. From Quine (1966, 1975) to Maddy (1997, 2007), the importance of doing 
philosophy in close connection to empirical results and scientific practice is a well-established 
field of study. BLM see themselves as a part of his development, and they want to conduct: 
philosophical study of mathematics as a discipline based on empirical facts […]. Such an approach 
could be called “naturalistic”, as in Maddy (1997), or it could be called a “Second Philosophy of 
Mathematics”, as in Maddy (2007). We shall use the label “Empirical Philosophy of Mathematics” 
in order to stress the fact that there is actual empirical work to be done. (BLM, p. 323) 
                                                          
1 The account here is based on five articles: Buldt, Löwe & Müller 2008 (BLM from now on); Löwe 2007; Löwe & Müller 2008 (LM); Löwe, Müller & Müller-Hill 2010 (LMM); Müller-Hill 2009. There is also a book expanding the EPM case (Löwe & Müller (eds.) 2010), as well as presenting other angles to the empirical study of mathematics. The project is also sometimes called “new epistemology of mathematics” in the literature (e.g. BLM). 
 
The connection between EPM and Maddy, however, is not necessarily as close as BLM claim 
above. Maddy’s naturalism and second philosophy refer to a “mathematics-first” type of approach 
in which mathematics should not be held to philosophical standards. In such an approach, it is not 
obvious that empirical research should play a major role in philosophy.  
Indeed, rather than Maddy, EPM has clearer connections to experimental philosophy as presented 
in e.g. Knobe & Nichols (ed.) (2008, 2013), in which traditional philosophical methodology is 
augmented by empirical studies conducted for philosophical purposes. In EPM, this empirical 
work could potentially include a wide array of possible subjects and methods, as long as they are 
committed to empirical facts and the empirical checking of theories. Indeed, the existing body of 
work in the EPM program already employs a diverse methodology, including analysis of historical 
texts and contemporary mathematical journals, as well as more traditional philosophical 
considerations.  
In this paper, I will focus on the currently furthest-developed empirical study carried out in the 
name of the EPM program, the questionnaire-based study of knowledge-ascriptions of 
mathematicians by Müller-Hill (2009). As well as being the most pronounced case of empirical 
work in EPM, it is also a paradigmatic case of deriving traditionally philosophical conclusions 
concerning mathematics from sociological data. In this paper I will thus use Müller-Hill's study as 
a case study of the EPM program, but also as a case study of the methodology and applicability of 
sociological approaches to the philosophy of mathematics. 
While increasingly many philosophers are ready to welcome a closer connection to mathematical 
practice – and perhaps even the introduction of empirical results to the philosophy of mathematics 
– in this respect the methodology of EPM is much more controversial. They argue that 
philosophical questions can - indeed, should - be tackled by surveys and interviews of 
mathematicians, which ”can yield genuine philosophical conclusions” (BLM, p. 325). In this, EPM 
clearly takes the philosophy of mathematics to the realm of experimental philosophy. As described 
by Knobe & Nichols (2008, p. 3), experimental philosophers: 
think that a critical method for figuring out how human beings think is to go out and 
actually run systematic empirical studies. Hence, experimental philosophers proceed by 
conducting experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people's 
intuitions about central philosophical issues. Again and again, these investigations have 
challenged familiar assumptions, showing that people do not actually think about these 
issues in anything like the way philosophers had assumed. 
As we will see in the next section, the study of mathematical knowledge by Müller-Hill falls right 
into this category. It is carried out by conducting experimental investigation of the intuitions of 
mathematicians. Interestingly, it challenges a familiar assumption often accepted in the philosophy 
of mathematics: that mathematical knowledge is objective and independent of context. 
 
2 The data 
The main focus of EPM so far has been on the concepts of mathematical knowledge and proof. In 
the most concrete empirical development, Müller-Hill (2009) studied the way in which 
mathematicians use those concepts by the method of an Internet questionnaire. To start off the 
survey, Müller-Hill presented the questions whether mathematical knowledge is objective and 
whether mathematical proof can be defined, getting positive answers 82.4% and 89.2% of the time, 
respectively. 
 
At the next stage of the survey, Müller-Hill presented a scenario in which a graduate student John 
works his way to prove his supervisor Jones’ conjecture (JC). John’s proof is accepted in a 
distinguished mathematical journal and the subjects were asked whether John knows that JC is 
true. As expected, 84.9% answered positively, 7.5% negatively and another 7.6% “can’t tell”.  2 
However, in the scenario it turns out that everything was not in order in John's proof. In fact, John 
discovers that there is in fact a counterexample to JC. Now the mathematicians were asked whether 
John knows that JC is false. 61.3% answered positively, 14.6% negatively and 24.2% could not 
tell. The considerable move from “yes” to “can’t tell” is curious, but the real surprise came when 
the subjects were asked whether John knew that JC was true the morning before he learned of the 
counterexample. 71.0% answered positively, 19.3% negatively and 9.7% could not tell.  
                                                          
2 Here I follow Müller-Hill’s example and lump together the answers “yes” and “almost surely yes” into one positive category of answers, and likewise for the negative answers. 
 
It should be noted that the last two questions were presented on the same web page, so the subjects 
could all the time see their answers to both of them. The majority of the test subjects did not seem 
to mind the contradictory position that mathematical knowledge is objective, but it is still possible 
that John knew JC to be true the day before, yet now knew it to be false. 
Before we try to make sense of these seemingly contradicting data, I must present some 
methodological criticism of Müller-Hill’s study. First, the target group was said to consist of 
“international research or teaching mathematicians from all branches of mathematics”, led to the 
study by a link posted in Internet newsgroups. But since important claims are made based on the 
assumption that the subjects are mathematicians, can we be sure that the survey reached the correct 
target group? Indeed, what do we want to include in the definition of mathematician? Top 
researchers and high-school teachers are both mathematicians in the sense of the survey, yet in 
their occupations very different standards are required of mathematical knowledge. Since the 
understanding of mathematical knowledge is crucial to the answers, can we know that the 
heterogeneity of the subject group does not affect the data?3 
 
Second, while the questions about the scenario of John and JC included the option “can’t tell”, the 
preliminary questions about objectivity and definability of mathematical proof did not. The 
objectivity of mathematical knowledge, in particular, is a deep philosophical question that many 
mathematicians would presumably not be ready to answer conclusively. To force them to do just 
that can affect the data dangerously.4 
 
                                                          
3 Further problems include the fact that only 108 of the 250 received responses were valid (this with extremely soft criteria: submitting personal data and one question answered was enough), of which 76 were from the target group. In addition, 21.0% percent of the target group answered that they do not possess a degree in mathematics. 
 
4 Another important detail is that in the questionnaire, the two preliminary questions were given different alternatives. For the question about mathematical knowledge, there were only two options: yes and no. For the one about definability of proof, there were four options: agree, disagree and “strong” versions of both. It may not be insignificant that 60.8% of the subjects agreed (but not strongly so) with the definability of proof. It is worth asking how committed these subjects in fact were to the objectivity of mathematical knowledge. 
 
Third, the amount of valid replies received in the study was ultimately quite low, only 53 in some 
questions and at most 74. In a sample that small, just a handful of “can’t tells” changed into 
conclusive answers can make an important difference. At best, a full 24.2% answered “can’t tell” 
to a question. One must wonder how many would have taken the same option in the question about 
the objectivity of mathematical knowledge, had it been available. 
Fourth, the most important finding - that even after learning that JC was false, 71.0% still thought 
John knew JC to be true before the counter-example - seems to be largely unsupported by other 
data in the survey.5 
 
With these and some minor issues, it seems that further study is necessary before making any 
conclusive claims about mathematicians’ beliefs - not to mention their possible philosophical 
conclusions. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the main finding is an interesting one, and quite 
unlikely to be totally due to the methodological flaws in the study. The subjects were ready to 
claim that mathematical knowledge is objective, but they also answered that we can know a 
sentence and its negation to be true at different times. In LMM (2007, p. 12) it is revealed that of 
the 38 participants who thought that John knew JC to be false after the counterexample, a full 27 
(71.1%) still answered that John knew JC to be true on the morning before the counterexample.  
While eliminating the weaknesses from the survey (the lack of non-committal option in the 
question about the objectivity of mathematical knowledge is particularly pertinent here) could 
change the data considerably, it is still fair to believe that there is a large group of working 
mathematicians who hold both the position that mathematical knowledge is objective and that one 
can know a sentence to be true at time t and to be false at another time t’. This is certainly an 
interesting piece of data and it demands a deeper analysis. 
 
3 Conclusions from the data 
                                                          
5 It should be noted, however, that there is also a second scenario described in Müller-Hill 2009 (pp. 14-16) which does give some added support for the main conclusions of the study.  
 
The most surprising finding of Müller-Hill’s study was that mathematicians were ready to accept 
that John knew JC to be true even after they have learned that there was a mistake in the proof. 
Based on the survey, mathematicians believe mathematical knowledge to be objective, yet they 
accept that John knows a sentence φ at time t and the sentence ¬φ at time t′.  Based on this, in 
Müller-Hill (2009) and especially in LMM (2010), together with other arguments, it is concluded 
that mathematical proof and mathematical knowledge are context-dependent for the subject 
group.6  Our old standards for mathematical proof and knowledge that take the two concepts to be 
objective, LMM (p. 16) argue, must be revised and in the philosophy of mathematics proof and 
knowledge should be seen as context-sensitive, i.e., the concepts of mathematical proof and 
mathematical knowledge should be seen to have different meanings in different settings. 
 
We will return to that wider question in the next section, but for now let us focus on the survey 
data. That so many mathematicians were ready to make two conflicting statements about 
mathematical knowledge is a strong result, but what makes the result even stronger is the 
conclusion that, according to the survey, this contradicts with their own understanding of 
mathematical truth. In the survey, the vast majority agreed that mathematical truth is objective, yet 
they still accepted that we can know the same sentence to be both true and false at different times. 
Certainly there seems to be something peculiar in such conception of knowledge, and the claim of 
context-dependency is not unreasonable. 
However, is the problem really with their conception of objective mathematical knowledge? The 
main difficulty with the conclusion of context-dependency that EPM makes is that we do not have 
a clear enough idea what the subjects understood the relevant notion of mathematical knowledge 
to be. It is true that the subjects clearly made contradictory knowledge-ascriptions when answering 
the survey. In this way, there is a sense in which mathematical knowledge was indeed context-
sensitive for them. In the context of the initial question, they thought mathematical knowledge to 
be objective. In the context of the scenario involving John and JC, they appeared to contradict that.  
In order to be philosophically relevant, however, we must be sure that the contradiction is due to 
something more substantial than simply a careless use of the word “know”. If we want to make 
                                                          
6 The other arguments are developed furthest in LM 2008. 
 
the kind of conclusions from Müller-Hill’s data as EPM does, we would need to know what the 
test subjects understood by knowledge at each stage when answering the survey. The most explicit 
thing we know is that, when needing a definite answer, 82.4% of the subjects believed 
mathematical knowledge to be objective. But this is not quite the clarification we would need. 
First, we cannot tell whether they even meant to use the same concept of knowledge throughout 
the survey. Second, we don’t know what the subjects interpret objectivity to mean.  
Objectivity can be characterized both as “you can’t make up your own rules” and “there exists a 
Platonist world of mathematical ideas”. In order to make conclusions about context-dependency, 
we would need to clarify what objective mathematical knowledge is understood to be. In the survey 
of Müller-Hill, knowledge is only divided into objective and non-objective, and as such these are 
quite vague concepts. If, as the second scenario of Müller-Hill (pp. 14-16) suggests, knowledge is 
often ascribed even to a superficial memorizing of a proof, it is hardly surprising that mathematical 
knowledge ends up being context-dependent. However, this could equally well be interpreted as 
evidence that the subjects understood objectivity in a very weak way, thus explaining why they 
were prepared to accept both the objectivity of mathematical knowledge and the knowledge-
ascriptions for both JC and its negation. 
In any case, in a project of empirical epistemology, the result should not be interpreted 
automatically to concern mathematical knowledge in the philosophical sense – which is just what 
Müller-Hill and LMM seem to do. Without further questions, this is clearly something we cannot 
claim. What would be needed is a more thorough background questionnaire about the notion of 
mathematical knowledge that the subjects have, including questions differentiating between 
knowledge in the strict philosophical sense and knowledge sufficient to pass tests, and indeed, get 
articles published.  
Without such information, all we know is that the subjects made inconsistent knowledge 
ascriptions when answering the questionnaire. But the philosophical relevance of that is 
questionable, since the subjects had no reason to be particularly careful in making knowledge 
ascriptions. They may well have thought, for example, that “to know” in the scenario involving 
John could mean something along the lines “had good reason to believe”. That would not suggest 
context-dependency of mathematical knowledge. Rather, it could only be due to many uses of the 
verb “to know” being quite distant from any philosophical ideal of justified true belief, or similar. 
In conclusion, there seem to be three possible interpretations of the data of Müller-Hill. The first 
one is that the survey gets the objectivity of mathematical knowledge correct, and the questions 
concerning the scenarios only worked to confuse the subjects. This interpretation can be rejected 
right away for two reasons. First, as stated above, there is too much that is not clear in the concept 
of objectivity to be settled this easily. And of course second, it would be highly questionable to 
outright reject survey data which clearly point out a difficulty in whatever concepts of objectivity 
and knowledge the subjects used.  
The second interpretation is the one that LMM make: the survey gets the context-dependency 
correct, and when the subjects overwhelmingly professed to objectivity in the first question of the 
study, they did so under a mistaken conception. I see two problems also with this conclusion. First, 
we have seen that the concepts of knowledge and objectivity would have to be clarified in the 
survey. Second, this interpretation goes on to say that the majority of the 82.4% did not know what 
they were saying when they believed mathematical knowledge to be objective. The problems with 
the survey notwithstanding, this is a strong piece of data to just reject because it contradicts with 
other data in the study. 
That brings us to the third interpretation: the answers reveal a possible confusion or equivocation 
which prevents us from making any strong conclusions. Based on the arguments above, I claim 
that this is the case. We simply cannot know that the concepts of knowledge, objectivity and proof 
were meant to be used in congruent enough ways to warrant strong conclusions about them. 
Subjects may well have taken the first question about objectivity to be a philosophical one, thus 
employing a strong conception of objectivity and mathematical knowledge. But when they 
approached the scenario about John and the JC, they may have had a different mindset: an everyday 
one in which we talk about knowing quite haphazardly.  
Had it been clear that we are dealing with what most skilled mathematicians believe to be the 
nature of mathematical knowledge in the deep down philosophical sense, and would still be ready 
to ascribe this concept of knowledge both to the case of John knowing the falsehood of JC after 
the counterexample and him knowing its truth before the counterexample, then we could perhaps 
be warranted in making the kind of conclusions LMM do.  
Even with these adjustments, however, there would remain some important questions to ask about 
the sociological approach. Most importantly, how much weight should we give the survey method 
when it comes to philosophical questions? Certainly there can be value in such surveys, but are we 
warranted in making direct conclusions about philosophical concepts like knowledge in the 
manner of LMM - in particular when we have no idea of the argumentation and thought process 
behind the survey answers? We will deal with these questions in Section 5. 
 
4 Context-dependency of mathematical knowledge 
My criticism above concerns the Müller-Hill study and the interpretation of it in LMM (2010), but 
in LM (2008) there are also other arguments for the context-dependency of mathematical 
knowledge. What they oppose to is the view that there exists a uniform standard for accepted 
mathematical proofs. In particular, mathematical proofs are very rarely complete derivations of 
theorems from axioms, which is often given as the standard. As Fallis (2003, 55) writes: 
The point of publishing a proof [...] is to communicate that proof to other mathematicians. 
In other words, the mathematician wants to get the particular sequence of propositions that 
he has in his mind into the minds of other mathematicians. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
most efficient way for the mathematician to do this is not by laying out the entire sequence 
of propositions in excruciating detail. 
There should be very little to contest in Fallis’ assessment: it is quite clear that the level of detail 
varies. Skilled mathematicians require less detail in order to understand the sequence of 
propositions that constitutes a proof, while a novice would no doubt benefit from more detailed 
derivations. In this fashion, LM (2008) arrive from the supposed invariant starting point (p. 92): 
S knows that P iff S has available proof of P 
at the context-dependent result (p. 104): 
S knows that P iff S’s current mathematical skills are sufficient to produce the form of 
proof or justification for P required by the actual context. 
What is meant by “actual context” here are simply the requirements that proofs (or other 
justifications) have in that particular area of mathematical practice. So basically, mathematical 
knowledge according to LM is a widely varied concept determined by the subject and the 
surroundings. In this picture, formal derivation retains its power solely by being “important for the 
foundations of mathematics, but [...] it hardly plays any role in determining the truth of 'S knows 
that P'” (LM, p. 105).  
While the strict formalist picture of mathematics as complete derivations indeed is a bad fit with 
actual human mathematicians, to say that formal derivation “hardly plays any role” is an 
exaggeration. It is clear that mathematical communication is done largely informally, but it is 
commonly thought (e.g. Azzouni 2004) that the informal proofs come with the “promise” that 
there is an underlying formal structure that can be checked with algorithmic procedures. Indeed, 
with the development of modern computer tools for proof checking, this is not a mere philosophical 
idealization. Strictly formalized mathematics is now a well-established field and its growing 
importance goes directly against the claim of Löwe & Müller.7 
 
Yet EPM takes the context-dependency even further: Buldt (BLM 2008, p. 314) states that “the 
conceptual framework of mathematics has changed so dramatically that, say, identifying Greek 
numbers with modern axiomatic characterizations just seems outrageous.” I argue that also this is 
an exaggeration. Take the example of Euclid’s (ca. 300 B.C.) proof that there are infinitely many 
prime numbers (Elements, Book IX, Proposition 20).  
Let A, B, and C be the assigned prime numbers. 
I say that there are more prime numbers than A, B, and C. 
Take the least number DE measured by A, B, and C. Add the unit DF to DE. 
Then EF is either prime or not. 
First, let it be prime. Then the prime numbers A, B, C, and EF have been found which are 
more than A, B, and C.  
Next, let EF not be prime. Therefore it is measured by some prime number (by proposition 
31, book VII, author's note). Let it be measured by the prime number G. 
I say that G is not the same with any of the numbers A, B, and C. 
                                                          
7 Perhaps the most notable medium for strictly formalized mathematics is the journal Formalized Mathematics, which uses the Mizar system. The Mizar library has the largest collection of strictly formalized mathematical proofs there is. There are also many other proof assistant softwares available, such as Coq and Isabelle.  
 
If possible, let it be so. Now A, B, and C measure DE, therefore G also measures DE. But 
it also measures EF. Therefore G, being a number, measures the remainder, the unit DF, 
which is absurd. 
Therefore G is not the same with any one of the numbers A, B, and C. And by hypothesis 
it is prime. Therefore the prime numbers A, B, C, and G have been found which are more 
than the assigned multitude of A, B, and C. 
Therefore, prime numbers are more than any assigned multitude of prime numbers. Q.E.D. 
It would indeed seem that Euclid's numbers are radically different from our modern 
axiomatizations. Numbers are not understood to be objects, but rather multitudes of unit line 
segments. Instead of divisibility, Euclid talks of measuring. And instead of the infinity of the set 
of prime numbers, as we would now state the matter, Euclid is proving that given a list of primes, 
we can find a greater prime. 
There is much else in Euclid that looks unfamiliar to a modern reader. We would not write, for 
example, “A, B, and C” to refer to any finite list of prime numbers. This was a common method 
in Ancient Greece. Instead of a general method, an example was given. At first glance, then, it 
might seem that Euclid's proof does not count as a proof at all in the modern sense. Yet, to anybody 
who has taken an introductory course in number theory, Euclid's proof looks extremely familiar. 
Indeed, nowadays the standard proof of the infinity of prime numbers goes something like this:  
Let ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡ be the finite list of all prime numbers. Let ܯ = ݌ଵ × ݌ଶ ×⋯× ݌௡ + 1. 
Either M is a prime or it is not. Let us first suppose it is. In that case we have found a prime 
that is not on the list ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡. Let us now suppose M is not a prime. Following the 
Fundamental theorem of arithmetic8, M is the product of primes, and hence it is divisible 
by some prime ݌௜. Now ݌௜ cannot be any of  ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡, because if it were, it would 
divide ݌ଵ × ݌ଶ ×⋯× ݌௡. But in that case it would also divide 1, which is impossible. So 
݌௜  cannot be on the list  ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ, … , ݌௡. In either case, we have found a prime that is not a 
part of the original list, so there is no greatest prime. 
                                                          
8 Euclid's proposition 31 in the Book VII is essentially stating the Fundamental theorem of arithmetic. 
 
 
Compare that proof with Euclid's and it is immediately obvious that the structure of the proof is 
essentially the same. He works under a different conception of number, but he reaches the same 
result, by the same structure of argumentation. This is of course only one example and the current 
knowledge of arithmetic goes way beyond Euclid's number theory. There are also obviously great 
formal differences. There, for example, is no axiom of induction or infinity in Euclid. But is this 
enough to say that the numbers Euclid was working with are essentially different from our 
numbers?  
We need to acknowledge that while mathematicians of different times work with different formal 
standards, as well as different interpretations of the basic concepts, that does not necessarily make 
their mathematics essentially different. Euclid saw numbers as multiples of the unit line segment, 
modern mathematicians often see them as sets. On a first look, it might indeed seem suspicious to 
identify the two. However, if this is indeed problematic in philosophy, it is problematic for EPM 
rather than for the traditional accounts that the mathematical proof to be objective. If mathematics 
is not about formal derivations, as the proponents of EPM claim, the fact that we cannot formally 
identify Euclid's numbers with ours seems to be of secondary importance. According to EPM, 
mathematics is not essentially about such formal proofs. While there are important differences in 
the notations and concepts, the remarkable thing is that the structure of Euclid's proof is essentially 
the same as the one in our informal proof above, which we could easily formulate into a proof in 
formal axiomatic arithmetic. 
Indeed, rather than being an argument for the context-dependency of mathematical knowledge, 
Euclid's numbers seem more like an example of how little context-dependency there is in 
mathematics. Even with superficial differences, the same inferences can be used thousands of years 
apart with the same level of certainty. When Buldt claims that “identifying Greek numbers with 
modern axiomatic characterizations just seems outrageous”, the context-dependent aspects of 
mathematics – which undoubtedly exist – are given too much philosophical weight.9 
                                                          
9 Of course strictly speaking we cannot formally identify Euclid's numbers with modern axiomatic characterizations, so taken literally, I agree with Buldt. However, in the context of EPM the strict sense is clearly not the relevant sense. Even with the differences, I believe the 
 
5 The relevance of sociological methods for philosophy 
Above I have criticized some of the work done in the EPM program on two counts: the empirical 
methods and the philosophical conclusions. The methods can definitely be fixed and the 
conclusions would obviously have to be reassessed based on further empirical evidence. But 
regardless of the particular research details, there is also a third question that is independent of 
those issues: the overall justification of projects like Müller-Hill's study. For me it is hard to share 
the optimism of Müller-Hill and LMM when it comes to surveys as the basis of philosophical 
conclusions. I see no pressing reason to disagree with the traditional view that philosophical 
questions about mathematics can have correct answers and they can be reached with philosophical 
argumentation. In particular, there is little reason to believe that mathematicians have privileged 
access to those answers.  
In this respect, EPM has clear parallels with experimental philosophy. As Williamson (2015) 
notes, in a broad sense experimental philosophy covers experimental inquiry with a philosophical 
purpose. Few philosophers are likely to find such empirical work unacceptable. The problem only 
comes with a narrower understanding of experimental philosophy, the so-called “negative 
program” which challenges many of the methods of analytic “armchair” philosophy.10 
 
As presented in BLM, EPM does not aim to dismiss all traditional philosophical methodology, and 
as such should be included with the broader sense of experimental philosophy. However, in the 
conclusions of LMM (p. 16), the result of Müller-Hill is analyzed as follows: 
a philosopher endorsing the traditional view of epistemology of mathematics is not able to 
accept the statement “John knows φ at time t and John knows ¬φ at time t′.” However, a 
large number of our test subjects did exactly that, and so we either have to accept a notion 
                                                          huge similarities in the structures of proofs etc. are more relevant when we consider claims of context-dependency of mathematical knowledge. 
 
10 Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001) is perhaps the best-known paper advocating the negative program. 
 
of mathematical knowledge that ignores the usage of this large portion of the community, 
or give up the traditional view. Based on our methodological position, we discard the 
former option and choose the latter.  
Even forgetting the problems of Müller-Hill's study, this seems like a radical conclusion. Note that 
LMM are not merely saying that we should re-evaluate the former option: they claim that we 
should discard it. When traditional analytic philosophy is put against experimental philosophy, at 
least in this case EPM chooses the latter - thus suggesting parallels with the narrower negative 
reading of experimental philosophy. 
This is quite problematic. It is easier to agree that empirical studies can be introduced to give a 
better overall understanding of philosophical issues. Understood in this way, we would not be 
advocating a radical revolution in the methodology of philosophy of mathematics. But the ease 
with which LMM dismiss traditional epistemology of mathematics in the above quotation suggests 
something else. While they may not explicitly reject traditional philosophical methods, they are 
ready to claim that a questionnaire-study that neglects all philosophical argumentation is enough 
to discard traditional epistemology of mathematics.11 
 
In EPM, the role of mathematicians in the philosophy of mathematics becomes considerably wider 
and stronger than it has traditionally been. In addition to providing the subject matter for 
philosophers of mathematics, even in the strong primary sense of Maddy, mathematicians are seen 
to have a privileged insight into philosophical problems concerning mathematics. In doing that, in 
addition to the negative program in experimental philosophy, the sociological angle of EPM has 
parallels with the sociology of science of Bloor (1976) and Latour (1987). Bloor (1976, p. 2) writes 
that: 
The sociologist is concerned with knowledge, including scientific knowledge, purely as a 
natural phenomenon. His definition of knowledge will therefore be rather different from 
                                                          
11 It should be noted that LMM do not suggest that we must conclusively discard the traditional view, only that we should now develop the context-dependent view. But this in itself is a strong result, as it clearly values the experimental methodology over the traditional one when the two are at odds. 
 
that of either the layman or the philosopher. Instead of defining it as true belief, knowledge 
for the sociologist is whatever men take to be knowledge. 
Based on the study of Müller-Hill and its interpretation in LMM, EPM seems to be open to such 
understanding of knowledge when it comes to mathematics. But while expanding the methodology 
of philosophy is easy to accept, weakening the role of argumentation in the philosophy of 
mathematics is much more controversial. Even if the subjects of Müller-Hill's study were 
undoubtedly the best experts on the question of mathematical knowledge, how much value do we 
want to give to philosophical opinions given completely without arguments? This is an extremely 
radical methodological revolution in the philosophy of mathematics. Taken to its extreme, it could 
replace all arguments from philosophy with the opinions of working mathematicians. While I am 
not claiming that EPM necessarily wants to go that far, it would be important to introduce 
philosophical criteria for evaluating the sociological explanations. 
All this is not to deny the importance of sociological studies of mathematics. Geist, Löwe & Van 
Kerkhove (2010), for example, provide an important reminder that also the mathematical 
community functions in part on knowledge by testimony and a necessarily imperfect peer review 
system. There are many other areas where studying the mathematical community and the opinions 
of mathematicians can give us important insights in philosophy. But we should be careful not to 
overestimate the reliability of sociological methods. The strong sociological program took 
relativizing scientific knowledge to extreme distances:  
[S]ince the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature’s representation not the 
consequence, we can never use the outcome – Nature – to explain how and why a 
controversy has been settled. (Italics in the original) (Latour 1987, p. 99) 
In Barnes, Bloor & Henry (1996, p. 168) it is claimed that: 
Scientific boundaries are defined and maintained by social groups concerned to protect and 
promote their cognitive authority, intellectual hegemony, professional integrity, and 
whatever political and economic power they might be able to command by attaining these 
things.  
This way, Latour aimed to reduce philosophy of science to the sociology of science and Barnes, 
Bloor & Henry presented science as a power game distinct from any considerations of finding out 
truths. I fear that if left unchecked, the sociological aspects of EPM could lead to such dramatic 
interpretations and reduce the philosophy of mathematics to sociology of mathematics.12 
 
In one way, however, the study of Müller-Hill is fundamentally different from the sociology of 
science. Whereas Latour and others emphasize that we should follow scientists “in action”, 
observing what they do, the study of Müller-Hill takes a fundamentally different approach: asking 
mathematicians what they think they do. Curiously, in BLM (2008, p. 320) there is a quote of Rota 
to the effect that the first line of study is the one we should prefer:  
An honest conception [of mathematical activity] must emerge from a dispassionate 
examination of what mathematicians do, rather than from what mathematicians say they 
do, or from what philosophers think mathematicians ought to do. (Rota 1991, p. 108) 
(Italics in the original)  
This approach, which is at the heart of the study of mathematical practice, has many advantages. 
If we want to gain insight into mathematics that we can use in philosophy, the crucial question 
would seem to be what mathematicians do, not what they say they do. There is no real evidence 
that expertise in mathematics somehow makes one better positioned to have philosophical insights.  
To present just one example, Kurt Gödel was perhaps the most important logician of the 20th 
century and a large part of his work is canonical in mathematical logic. Extremely few philosophers 
and mathematicians disagree with his logical and mathematical insights. Yet he was also a 
Platonist who held that mathematical objects such as numbers and sets exist independently of us 
in an abstract world of ideas that we access by a special mental faculty (Gödel 1964). Nowadays 
most philosophers do not give much weight to Gödel’s philosophical argumentation. His great 
ability as a mathematician is not seen to have given special insight to the philosophy of 
mathematics. But just as importantly, aside from the paper cited above, there is very little in 
Gödel’s logical writings to suggest his radical Platonism. In the systematic study of Gödel’s logical 
work, the philosophical angles seem largely irrelevant.  
                                                          
12 This connection between EPM and experimental philosophy, as well as the strong sociological program, is not mere similarity in argumentation and methodology. In LMM (p. 8) connections to, e.g., Stich (2001) and Latour and Woolgar (1979) are explicitly stated. 
 
This is the main methodological problem when sociological studies draw on the insights of 
mathematicians. Professional mathematicians may or may not have philosophical insights that 
correspond to their professional efforts. We must certainly appreciate their mathematical work, in 
which they have training, experience and high credibility. But when it comes to their philosophical 
opinions, the matter is quite different. When given completely without argumentation, there are 
two potential problems. First, we have no way of estimating the value and reliability of the 
philosophical view even for that particular mathematician. We do not know whether it is the result 
of systematic drawing of insights from the subject's mathematical work, or perhaps little more than 
a hunch. Basically, when applied as directly to philosophical questions as in the study of Müller-
Hill, the methodology of surveys comes down to accepting the word of an authority as having 
philosophical weight. But if there is one great strength in the traditional methodology of 
philosophy of mathematics, it is the lack of appeal to authorities. This still seems like a good rule 
to follow. 
Second, when accepting opinions without arguments as philosophically important, we are moving 
the focus on mathematicians from the area we know they have great expertise in, mathematical 
research and practice, to a much more dubious area. We simply have no reason to believe that 
mathematical expertise implies expertise in the philosophy of mathematics. 
That is also why the methods of philosophy of mathematical practice provide at the moment a 
more interesting direction than the questionnaire-based studies. They are based on expanding the 
domain of philosophy of mathematics to include something potentially essential to mathematics 
as a science: how it is actually practiced. In such a manner, there is great potential for sociological 
approaches. Replacing an ideal picture of formal mathematical theories with real-world 
mathematics can give us important insights in philosophy. After all, it gives us information about 
the time-tested methods that have made mathematics successful.  
Perhaps there are also philosophical beliefs inherent in them. It could well be the case that 
philosophical insights do emerge from practicing mathematics. However, determining this requires 
detailed philosophical study of mathematical practice, or a careful analysis of the argumentation 
behind those insights. It is not something we can simply assume. 
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